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Abstract
We analyse recent proposals to shift the tax burden away from low-paid
labour, assuming a dual labour market where the ’good’ high-paying jobs
are rationed. A shift in the tax burden from low–paid to high-paid workers
has an ambiguous e¤ect on the level of aggregate employment while the
allocation of aggregate employment is likely to be further distorted. Even if
the tax reform raises total employment, economic e¢ciency may be reduced
because labour is reallocated from high-productive to low-productive jobs.
Opportunities for on–the–job search have important implications for the
policy e¤ects. When these opportunities are small, the tax reform is more
likely to raise employment and welfare.
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During the past quarter century unskilled workers in most OECD countries have
experienced a huge increase in unemployment or a sharp decline in their relative
wages. Many economists have therefore argued that the tax burden should be
shifted away from low-paid workers to improve their employment opportunities
and to o¤set the tendency towards increased income inequality (e.g., Drèze and
Malinvaud (1994), Alogoskou…s et alia (1995), Phelps (1997), Sørensen (1997),
Haveman (1998), Van der Ploeg (1998)).
Shifting the tax burden away from low-paid labour will almost certainly re-
quire a higher tax burden on high-paid labour, for unless countries can coordinate
their tax policies, international capital mobility seriously constrains the ability of
individual countries to raise taxes on capital income. Recent research on the ef-
fects of taxation in imperfect labour markets suggests that increased progressivity
of the labour income tax may indeed stimulate employment, since high marginal
tax rates reduce the incentive for unions to push for higher wages and make it less
pro…table for employers to pay high e¢ciency wages (see for example Hoel (1990),
Lockwood and Manning (1993), Bulkley and Myles (1996), Koskela and Vilmunen
(1996), Pissarides (1998)). As unemployment bene…ts and welfare bene…ts tend
to establish a ‡oor for the wages of the unskilled, it is also possible that the labour
supply schedule of these workers is rather ‡at whereas labour supply at higher
1wage levels appears to be quite inelastic. Hence a shift of the tax burden away
from the low-paid might also raise total employment by exploiting such di¤erences
in labour supply elasticities.
The one-sector models underlying the recent papers on tax progressivity and
unemployment focus on the problem that the level of employment is ine¢ciently
low. In the present paper we also allow for the fact that increased labour tax
progressivity may have an undesirable impact on the allocation of employment by
promoting ‘bad’ jobs at the expense of ‘good’ jobs. The basis for this result is the
observation …rst made by Doeringer and Piore (1971) that the labour market has a
‘dual’ structure, being segmented into a ‘primary’ sector o¤ering high-productive,
high-wage career jobs, and a ‘secondary’ sector dominated by low-productive, low-
paying routine jobs. As emphasized by Bulow and Summers (1986), one reason for
such dualism in the labour market could be that some job functions are di¢cult to
monitor, inducing employers to pay high e¢ciency wages to promote work e¤ort
on the job, whereas other jobs which can be easily monitored are remunerated by
lower, competitive wages. Even for workers with similar skill levels, sectors with
monitoring problems will thus pay persistently higher wages and have persistently
higher productivity than sectors without such problems.
Overtheyearslaboureconomistshavegathered considerableevidencein favour
of the dual labour market hypothesis (see, e.g., Dickens and Lang (1985) and the
2survey by Saint-Paul (1996, pp.62-68)). The policy implication of this hypothe-
sis, stressed by Bulow and Summers (1986), is that the government should aim at
shifting resources from the low-productive secondary sector to the high-productive
primary sector. From this perspective lower taxes on low-paid workers combined
with higher taxes on high-paid workers seems an unattractive policy since it would
tend to work like a tax on the primary sector combined with a subsidy to the sec-
ondary sector.
Below we o¤er an analysis of labour tax reform which tries to allow for the
di¤erent policy concerns described above. We assume that a …xed level of unem-
ployment bene…ts generates an ine¢ciently low level of aggregate employment by
establishing a ‡oor for the wages of low-paid workers. In addition, the allocation
of employment is distorted, with employment in the primary sector being ine¢-
ciently low relative to employment in the secondary sector, as suggested by dual
labour market theory. Within this framework, a shifting of taxes from low-paid
to high-paid workers may raise total employment by inducing some of the unem-
ployed to accept a job in the secondary sector. At the same time the allocation of
employment is likely to be further distorted, and reduced activity in the primary
sectormay have negative feed-back e¤ectson activity in the secondary sector. One
purpose of our analysis is to investigate the likely net e¤ect on employment and
welfare. More generally, we wish to explore the general equilibrium mechanisms
3through which tax policy will work in an economy with a dual labour market.
We arrive at several conclusions which we believe to be interesting and non-
trivial. First of all, allowing for the distortion between the primary and the
secondary sector turns out to be very important for the evaluation of the welfare
e¤ects of public policy, in quantitative as well as in qualitative terms. A second
related point is that, even if apolicy measure succeeds in raising total employment,
it may still reduce the expected utility of the representative worker by causing a
reallocation away from the primary sector. Third, the opportunities for on-the-job
search in the secondary sector may have important implications for the e¤ects of
tax policy and - by extension - for the e¤ects of other public policies as well.
Our tool of analysis is a modi…ed and extended version of the dual labour
market model developed by Bulow and Summers (op.cit.). The economy’s pri-
mary sector is characterized by non-competitive e¢ciency wage setting causing
the ‘good’ high-paying jobs in that sector to be rationed, whereas the low-paying
‘bad’ jobs in the secondary sector are priced competitively. We extend this Bulow-
Summers set-up by including taxation, unemployment bene…ts and the govern-
ment budget constraint, by allowing for on-the-job search in the secondary sector,
and by relaxing the awkward Bulow-Summers assumption that leisure (shirking
on the job) and secondary sector goods are perfect substitutes. Moreover, while
Bulow and Summers retain the assumption of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) that
4the choice of work e¤ort on the job is a zero-one decision (you can either work all
the time or shirk all the time), we make the more realistic assumption that e¤ort
can be varied in a continuous manner.
Throughout our analysis we assume that the real after-tax rate of unemploy-
ment bene…t is kept constant. Although our model implies that a cut in real net
bene…ts could promote employment in both segments of the labour market, many
OECD governments have been reluctant to undertake major cuts in bene…ts, be-
cause of concerns over income distribution. Hence it is relevant and interesting
to investigate whether a labour tax reform could possibly raise total employment
and welfare without cutting into the living standards of the unemployed.
Since we wish to highlight the e¤ects of labour market dualism, we abstract
from worker heterogeneity by assuming that all workers have the same preferences
and skill endowments. Hence we do not account for the argument that tax cuts for
low-paid workers might open up new job opportunities for individuals with below-
normal productivity. In the concluding section we brie‡y discuss this limitation
of our analysis.
Section 2 describes our model and sections 3 and 4 analyse employment and
welfare e¤ects of labour tax reform under two alternative benchmark assumptions
regarding opportunities for on–the–job search. The concluding section 5 discusses
our results and suggests directions for future research.
52. A model of a dual labour market
2.1. Households
We consider a stationary state in a closed economy inhabited by identical house-
holds with in…nite horizons. The instantaneous utility of household i is given
by













The utility function is additively separable in utility from consumption, Ci, and
disutility from work e¤ort, ei. The positive parameter ± measures the elasticity
of marginal disutility. Ci is a Cobb–Douglas aggregate of goods produced in the
secondary sector, Cis, and goods produced in the primary sector, Cip. Primary
goods are chosen as the numeraire, and the price of secondary goods is denoted
ps.
Households employed in the primary sector
The primary production sector is described by an e¢ciency wage model of the
‘shirking’ variety, combining elements of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Pisauro
(1991). The e¤ort of employees cannot be perfectly monitored. Hence primary
workers have an incentive to shirk, thereby gaining utility from leisure on the job.
However, since some monitoring does take place, more shirking involves a greater
6risk of being …red on grounds of poor work performance. Being sacked in turn
implies an expected income loss, since the good high-paying jobs in the primary
sector are rationed. Choosing the optimal level of shirking requires trading o¤ the
marginal expected income loss from the higher probability of being …red against
the marginal utility of leisure on the job.
Let us be a bit more speci…c. The pre-tax wage rate per unit of time is wp.
O¢cial working time is institutionally …xed and normalized at unity, so wp is also
the pre-tax level of income for a primary worker. The tax rate on this income
is tp; and the price level is given by the Cobb-Douglas consumer price index p¯
s.
Since total real consumption must equal real net income, it follows from (2.1) that
the ‡ow utility of a worker employed in the primary sector is
up =









The level of e¤ort ep a¤ects not only ‡ow–utility in equation (2.3), but also the
probability of being …red, s, which is assumed to be given by




; s > 0; ´ > 0 (2.4)
where e is the ‘normal’ e¤ort exerted by workers in the …rm. Thus, the higher
the individual worker’s e¤ort relative to the average work norm, the lower his
probability of being …red for poor performance. Note that even if a worker lives
up to the standard work norm (ep = e), he still faces some exogenous probability
7s = s ¡´ of being …red because ongoing technological and organizational change
generates continuing labour turnover.
Let Vp denote the expected lifetime utility of a worker employed in the primary
sector, and let V ¤ indicate the lifetime utility in the best available outside option.
Vp is equal to the present discounted value of the ‡ow return to primary sector
employment. This ‡ow return is given by the ‡ow utility, up, minus the expected
‘capital loss’ resulting from the probability of being …red, s ¢ (Vp ¡ V ¤). If the
exogenous discount rate is ½, Vp equals
Vp =
up ¡ s ¢ (Vp ¡V ¤)
½
, Vp =
up + s ¢ V ¤
½ + s
(2.5)
The worker’s problem is to choose his level of e¤ort ep so as to maximize (2.5)















The LHS of equation (2.6) measures the expected gain in lifetime utility resulting
from a marginal increase in e¤ort, given that greater e¤ort reduces the probability
of being …red. In optimum, this marginal bene…t from e¤ort must equal the
marginal disutility from harder work, stated on the RHS of (2.6). Equation (2.6)
implicitly de…nes ep as a function of wp. By implicit di¤erentiation one can show
that @ep=@wp is always positive and that @2ep=@w2
p will be negative if and only
8if ± > 1, i.e. if the agents are su¢ciently risk averse. Hence the employer may
induce higher e¤ort by paying a higher e¢ciency wage, and ± > 1 will guarantee
that the e¤ort function of the employee is concave.
Households outside the primary sector
Workers who do not obtain a job in the primary sector have two alternative
options: they can either choose to go unemployed, receiving real after-tax bene…ts
b and having probability au of future employment in the primary sector, or they
can accept a job in the secondary sector. In this sector there are no moral hazard
problems, since work e¤orts can be perfectly monitored, and the secondary labour
market is therefore perfectly competitive. A secondary sector job involves a …xed
working time normalized at unity and pays a wage ws which is subject to the tax
rate ts: Workers employed in the secondary sector have probability as of obtaining
a primary sector job.
Since e¤ective working time equals o¢cial working time, we have es = 1 for
a secondary worker, while an unemployed worker clearly has no disutility from
work. Using (2.1), the ‡ow utilities of the two groups may thus be written in the
following way:
us =








uu = b (2.8)
The lifetime utility of households outside the primary sectorisgiven by the present
9discounted value of the ‡ow-return to unemployment and by the return to sec-
ondary sector employment, respectively. The ‡ow-return in each of these two
states equals the ‡ow–utility enjoyed in that state plus the expected ‘capital gain’
arising from the probability of obtaining a job in the primary sector:
Vs =
us + as ¢ (Vp ¡ Vs)
½
, Vs =




uu + au ¢ (Vp ¡ Vu)
½
, Vu =
uu + au ¢ Vp
½ + au
(2.10)
Since the secondary labour market is perfectly competitive, an unemployed
person always has the option of taking a secondary sector job, thereby enjoying
lifetime utility Vs. Similarly, a secondary sector worker can choose to quit his
job in order to join the ranks of the unemployed, receiving lifetime utility Vu.
In equilibrium the unemployed individuals prefer not to take a job (Vu ¸ Vs),
and workers in the secondary sector prefer not to quit (Vs ¸ Vu), implying the
arbitrage condition
Vu = Vs = V
¤ (2.11)
As emphasized by Bulow and Summers (1986), unemployment in this economy is
both voluntary and involuntary at the same time. It is involuntary in the sense
that an unemployed person cannot get a job in the primary sector even though he
is fully quali…ed and willing to accept such a job at the going primary sector wage.
On the other hand, unemployment is voluntary in the sense that the unemployed
turn down available jobs, because these secondary sector jobs are not su¢ciently
10attractive at the given level of government taxes and transfers.1
2.2. Firms
Production technology is linear in both sectors of the economy. With Np denoting
the number of persons employed in the primary sector (each putting ep units of
e¤ort into the job), output in this sector is ep ¢Np. Since the o¢cial working time
is equal to 1, the primary sector pro…t is
¼p = ep ¢ Np ¡ wp ¢ Np (2.12)
where ep is a function of wp, implicitly de…ned by equation (2.6). The represen-
tative wage-setting primary sector …rm maximizes pro…t with respect to Np and
wp; and its …rst–order conditions are







Equation (2.13) is a zero-pro…t condition, and equation (2.14) is the well–known
Solow–condition[Solow (1979)], obtained by calculating the …rst-order condition
for wp and inserting (2.13). The second–order conditions for this problem reduce
to the requirement that the e¤ort function of workers be concave. As noted above
this is the case i¤ ± > 1.
1In the terminology of Saint–Paul (1996) the unemployment is semi–involuntary.
11In the secondary sector the pro…t is given by
¼s = ps ¢ Ns ¡ ws ¢ Ns (2.15)
where Ns is the number of persons employed in the secondary sector, and each
secondary worker is supplying 1 unit of labour. By maximizing ¼s with respect
to Ns; we get the zero-pro…t condition for the secondary sector
ws = ps (2.16)
2.3. Wage formation
Wage curve in the primary sector
The elasticity of e¤ort with respect to the wage can be calculated by implicit



















Inserting the e¤ort elasticity (2.17) into the Solow–condition (2.14) and imposing
the symmetry condition ep = e, we get2
ep =
"






± ¢ (½ + s)
#1=(1+±)
(2.18)
Next we insert the …rst order condition for e¤ort (2.6), along with the symmetry
condition, into equation (2.18)




= ± ¢ (½ + s) ¢ (Vp ¡ V
¤) (2.19)
2Notice from (2.6) that, in symmetric equilibrium, the job destruction rate s = s¡´ for the
representative worker becomes exogenous.
12Since (2.11) implies that V ¤ is equal to Vu, we can insert equations (2.3), (2.5),
(2.8), (2.10), and (2.18) into (2.19) to get the following wage curve









c = 1 ¡
(1 + ±) ¢ (½ + s + au) + ´
± ¢ (1 + ±) ¢ (½ + s)
< 1 (2.21)
The variable c is the (endogenous) net replacement ratio in the primary sector.
Net wages in the primary sector are simply a mark–up over net unemployment
bene…ts, and according to (2.20) and (2.21) the mark–up is positively related
to the job …nding probability au. The higher au, the easier it is to get another
primary job if you are …red for shirking. This reduces the cost of shirking, and to
o¤set the resulting tendency for labour productivity to fall, employers pay higher
wages.
Wage curve in the secondary sector
The reservation wage in the secondary sector can be found by rewriting the ar-
bitrage condition (2.11). Inserting (2.9) and (2.10) into (2.11), we …nd a relation
between ‡ow utilities,
us = up ¢
"
au ¡ as




½ + s + as
½ + s + au
#
(2.22)
Substituting (2.3), (2.7), (2.8), (2.18) and (2.20) into (2.22), we get the wage curve














The secondary sector wage must settle at a level ensuring that the welfare of a
secondary worker equals the welfare of an unemployed person. If the probability of
…nding a future primary job does not depend on wether the worker is unemployed
or employed in the secondary sector (au = as), this arbitrage condition is met
when the real after-tax wage rate equals the real net unemployment bene…t plus
a mark-up compensating for the disutility of work. If the probability of …nding
primary sector employment is higher for the unemployed (au > as), the market
clearing secondary wage includes an additional compensation for the expected
capital loss resulting from the less favourable employment prospects. By contrast,
if au were less than as the wage in the secondary sector would fall below the sum
of the bene…t rate and the disutility of work. Equation (2.23) formalizes these
intuitive insights.
2.4. Closing the model
To close the model we need the government budget constraint











where Nu is the number of unemployed persons. We assume that the real after-tax
rate of unemployment bene…t (b) and the tax rate on secondary workers (ts) are set
14exogenously, and that the tax rate on primary workers (tp) adjusts endogenously
to ensure budget balance.
In general equilibrium product markets must clear. Using the government
budget constraint (2.24), the zero pro…t conditions (2.13) and (2.16) and the
demand function implied by the Cobb-Douglas utility function (2.2), we can write
the condition for clearing of the market for secondary sector output as
ps ¢ Ns = ¯ ¢ [ep ¢ Np + ps ¢ Ns] (2.25)
stating that the value of secondary sector output (LHS) must equal the total
expenditure on secondary goods (RHS) which is a constant share (¯) of national
income.
In a stationary state the out‡ow of workers from the primary sector equals the
in‡ow of workers into the sector
s ¢ Np = au ¢ Nu + as ¢ Ns (2.26)
where
as = ￿¢ au; ￿¸ 0 (2.27)
The parameter ￿depends on the structural characteristics of the labour market
determining the opportunities for on-the-job search in the secondary sector.
Finally, by normalizingtotal population at unity, we have the following identity
Nu + Np + Ns = 1 (2.28)
15The complete model can now be summarized by the equations (2.13), (2.16),
(2.18), (2.20), (2.21), (2.23), (2.24), (2.25), (2.26), (2.27), (2.28) determining the
variables Np; Ns; ep; wp; c; ws; tp; ps; au; as; and Nu.
3. A special case: as = au
The convention in the theory of dual labour markets has been to set as (￿) equal
to zero, thus ruling out on-the-job-search in the secondary sector. This assump-
tion goes back to the classical contribution by Harris and Todaro (1970) studying
rural migration and urban unemployment in developing countries. In that setting
it seems natural to assume that secondary sector workers have no opportunity of
obtaining primary sector jobs, since the secondary (rural) and primary (urban)
sectors are geographically separated. The Harris–Todaro assumption has been
maintained in the subsequent litterature on dual labour markets analysing de-
veloping countries [Stiglitz (1974), Calvo (1978)] as well as developed countries
[Bulow and Summers (1986)]. However, in a developed economy the secondary
and primary sectors are not geographically separated, and thus the original rea-
soning behind the Harris–Todaro assumption does not apply. Instead it has been
argued that secondary workers cannot search as e¢ciently as unemployed workers
because they have less time available for job search purposes. But as pointed
out by Lindbeck and Snower (1990) this argument is inconsistent with substan-
tial empirical evidence suggesting that on–the–job search is very common, and
16that workers coming directly from another job account for a large fraction of new
hirings. We will therefore analyse another benchmark case in which it is equally
possible for a secondary worker and for an unemployed person to …nd a job in the
primary sector (as = au). In section 4 we will then compare this case with the
Harris–Todaro case.
3.1. Reducing the system
Given as = au (￿= 1), we are able to reduce the system further. Using the




1 + b(1 + ±)




Since b and ts are exogenous, this equation uniquely determines the equilibrium
wage in the secondary sector. By inserting (2.16) and (2.18) into the zero pro…t









± ¢ (½ + s)
#1=±
(3.2)





















This equation is analogous to the No–Shirking–Condition in Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984) and Bulow and Summers (1986): an increase in primary sector employment
17reduces the cost of shirking, inducing …rms to pay higher wages to prevent too
much shirking.











where we have used (2.13) and (2.16). To close the system we need the government
budget constraint. By inserting (2.16) and (2.28) into (2.24), we get
b ¢ w
¯
s ¢ (1 ¡ Np ¡ Ns) = tp ¢ wp ¢ Np + ts ¢ ws ¢ Ns (3.5)
Equations (3.1)–(3.5) de…ne the system determining wp, ws, Np, Ns, and tp. To
gain a better understanding of the model, let us ignore the government budget
constraint for a while and treat tp as an exogenous variable. Given tp the system
is recursive: the wage curve in the secondary sector (3.1) determines ws, and
knowing ws we can infer the value of wp from the zero pro…t condition for the
primary sector (3.2). Given ws and wp, the wage curve in the primary sector (3.3)
determines primary sector employment Np, and secondary sector employment Ns
is then …nally found from the equilibrium condition for secondary sector goods
(3.4).
The general equilibrium of the dual labour market model is illustrated in
…gure 3.1. The vertical axis indicates wage rates in the two sectors, measured
in units of the primary sector numeraire good. The length of the horizontal
18axis equals the total labour force. From left to right we measure primary sector
employment, Np, and from right to left we measure employment in the secondary
sector, Ns. The horizontal distance between Np and Ns is equal to the number of
unemployed persons, Nu. The horizontal ws–curve corresponds to equation (3.1)
above. Given the location of the ws–curve, we can draw the zero pro…t condition
for the primary sector ZPCp (equation (3.2)) and the wp–curve (equation (3.3)).
The intersection of the wp– and ZPCp–curves determines wages, employment,
and thus total income in the primary sector. Knowing primary sector income, we
can draw the product market clearing condition for the secondary sector, PMCs,
from equation (3.4). The equilibrium level of employment in the secondary sector
is given by the intersection of the PMCs– and ws–curves.
It is not coincidental that the primary sector wage is higher than the secondary
sector wage in Figure 3.1. If this were not the case, a primary worker would
su¤er no loss in case he were …red for poor work performance. Hence primary
workers would shirk all the time, implying a zero level of primary sector output.
In equilibrium primary workers must therefore earn a rent compared to their
less fortunate colleagues in the secondary sector and in the unemployment pool.
The resulting wage and productivity gap implies an intersectoral distortion in
disfavour of the primary sector. A reallocation of workers from secondary to
primary employment would generate a welfare gain stemming from an increase in
19Figure 3.1: General Equilibrium in the Dual Labour Market Model
average labour productivity. This is the reasoning underlying the industrial policy
proposals discussed in Bulow and Summers (1986) suggesting that the government
should subsidize high–wage sectors at the expense of low–wage sectors.
Actually there are two ‘sector’ distortions in this economy. First, e¢ciency
wage setting in the primary sector causes too many persons to be outside that
sector. Second, the tax-transfer system causes too many of the remaining persons
to opt for unemployment. Concern about the …rst distortion calls for a lower
tax on high–paid workers, whereas concern about the second distortion suggests
the need for a lower tax on low–paid workers. However, reducing both taxes at
the same time is not feasible unless there are La¤er curve e¤ects. Absent such
20e¤ects, a lower tax burden on one type of workers must be …nanced by a higher
tax burden on the other type of workers. A priori one cannot conclude in which
direction the tax burden should be shifted in order to improve employment and
welfare.
3.2. Shifting the tax burden from low–paid workers to high–paid work-
ers: a graphical illustration
In …gures 3.2 and 3.3 we illustrate the e¤ects of shifting the tax burden away
from low–paid labour (reducing ts) towards high–paid labour (increasing tp). In
practice this might be implemented by introducing an Earned Income Tax Credit
targeted at low paid workers, …nanced by raising the marginal and average tax rate
on higher levels of labour income3. A lower tax rate for secondary sector workers
(…gure 3.2) reduces the reservation wage of unemployed persons, and thus the ws–
curve shifts downwards. The reduction in secondary sector wages causes the price
of secondary sector goods to fall. Hence the real consumer wage in the primary
sector goes up, inducing primary workers to increase their work e¤ort. With a
greater work e¤ort the product wages in the primary sector will have to increase
to prevent the emergence of positive pro…ts. This explains the upward shift in the
ZPCp–curve. At the same time the reduction in the relative price of secondary
3A targeted Earned Income Tax Credit which is phased out as labour income goes up would
raise the e¤ective marginal tax rate for low-paid workers while at the same time lowering their
average tax rate. However, in our model where individual work hours for secondary workers are
…xed, the behaviour of secondary workers is independent of the marginal tax rate, depending
only on the average tax rate.
21goods implies that …rms in the primary sector can maintain a given level of real
consumer wages (and hence a given level of e¤ort) with a lower real product
wage. As a result the wp–curve moves downwards, and the new equilibrium in
the primary sector is characterized by wage level w¤
p and employment level N¤
p.
Because of higher wages and employment in the primary sector the total income
generated in that sector goes up, causing higher demand for goods produced in the
secondary sector. Hence the PMCs–curve shifts upwards, so the new equilibrium
level of secondary sector employment is given by N¤
s. Thus, reducing the average
tax rate in the secondary sector has a positive e¤ect on employment in both sectors
of the economy. There is a direct boost to secondary sector employment through
the arbitrage condition for unemployed workers. This e¤ect improves the terms
of trade for the primary sector, thereby stimulating employment in that sector
as well, and higher primary employment in turn reinforces the rise in secondary
employment via the product market for secondary goods.
Unfortunately, the government budget constraint implies that, in order to reap
the above bene…ts, it is necessary to raise the tax rate on the high-paid workers
in the primary sector (still assuming no La¤er curve e¤ects). The e¤ects of this
less attractive component of the policy experiment are illustrated in Figure 3.3.
A higher marginal tax rate reduces the e¤ort exerted by workers in the primary
sector, thus shifting down the zero pro…t condition ZPCp. At the same time
22Figure 3.2: Reducing the Average Tax Rate in the Secondary Sector
23Figure 3.3: Increasing the Average Tax Rate in the Primary Sector
24the wp–curve shifts upwards since primary sector …rms have to pay higher pre-
tax wages to maintain a given level of e¤ort. In the new equilibrium wages and
employment in the primary sector are lower, implying a fall in total primary sector
income which reduces the demand for secondary sector goods, thereby reducing
employment in that sector as well.
In other words, although the graphical analysis highlights the various mech-
anisms involved in shifting the tax–burden from low–paid labour to high–paid
labour, it does not allow any conclusions regarding the net e¤ect on employment
in either of the two sectors. We will now look further into this question, taking
explicit account of the government budget constraint.
3.3. Shifting the tax burden from low–paid workers to high–paid work-
ers: an analytical solution
The multipliers for the system (3.1)–(3.5) are derived on the assumption that
the initial equilibrium is characterized by purely proportional taxation (tp = ts).
When the tax rate on low-paid workers is cut, the necessary change in the tax







































4The results reported in this section are derived in an appendix available from the authors.
25The parameter " ´
1
1+± is the elasticity of work e¤ort with respect to the real net
wage (see (2.18)), and ° is the numerical elasticity of wp with respect to 1 ¡ Np
along the wage curve for the primary sector, 1 ¡Np being the number of persons
applying for a job in that sector. In the present two–sector model ° is analogous
to the elasticity of the wage with respect to unemployment in one–sector models.
Since " < 1, it follows from (3.7) that ¢ will surely be negative for all feasible
values of Np ￿ 1 as long as ° does not exceed unity. According to the extensive
cross-country evidence provided by Blanch‡ower and Oswald (1994), a value of
° around 0:1 seems to be a remarkably robust estimate. Hence we may safely
assume that ¢ is negative. From (3.6) we see that a value of ° below unity is also
su¢cient (but far from necessary) to guarantee that a lower tax rate on secondary
workers must be accompanied by a higher tax rate on primary workers, thus ruling
out La¤er curve e¤ects.





















































Assuming ¢ < 0 and recalling that c < 1, we have dNp=dts > 0; implying that a
shift in the tax burden in favour of low–paid labour reduces employment in the
26primary sector. According to (3.9) the e¤ect on secondary sector employment is
ambiguous. The reason is that the tax reform elicits two o¤setting e¤ects on the
demand for secondary sector output. On the one hand secondary employment is
stimulated by a tendency for the relative wage and price of the secondary sector
to fall (an e¤ect captured by the …rst product in the square bracket on the RHS
of (3.9)), but on the other hand the demand for secondary output is reduced by
falling employment in the primary sector (re‡ected by the last term on the RHS
of (3.9)).
4. The importance of on-the-job search
The preceding analysis assumed that a worker has the same probability of …nding
a primary sector job whether he is unemployed or engaged in secondary sector
work (as = au). By contrast, conventional dual labour market theory assumes
that workers must line up in the unemployment queue before they can hope to
obtain a job in the primary sector (as = 0, the Harris–Todaro case). As noted
earlier, the Harris–Todaro assumption is contradicted by a substantial body of
evidence indicating that on–the–job search plays an important role in real world
labour markets (see Clark and Summers (1979), Jackman (1983) and Pissarides
and Wadsworth (1994)). Yet there is no reason to believe that the probability
of …nding a primary sector job is exactly the same for secondary sector workers
and for the unemployed. Although the value of as seems to be positive, it may be
27considerably lower (or higher) than the value of au, so in principle we cannot say
whether the as = au case is more or less realistic than the Harris–Todaro case.
Hence it is relevant to study whether the e¤ects of tax reform are signi…cantly
a¤ected by the assumption made about labour market ‡ows.
Since the technical analysis gets quite complicated when as 6= au (￿6= 1), we
resort to computer simulations, assigning numerical values to all parameters in
the model. The elasticity of the marginal disutility of work e¤ort (±) is set equal
to 9. This implies an elasticity of work e¤ort w.r.t. the real net wage equal to
0:1, in line with typical estimates of labour supply elasticities. The budget share
of goods produced in the secondary sector (¯) is set at 0:3, and the rate of time
preference (½) is calibrated so as to generate an numerical elasticity of wp with
respect to 1 ¡ Np equal to 0:1 along the wage curve for the primary sector. The
equilibrium rate of labour turnover s = s ¡ ´ in the primary sector (s) is taken
to be 0:25, and the sensitivity of the individual worker’s …ring probability with
respect to the level of work e¤ort (´) is calibrated such that the net replacement
ratio is 0:6 in the initial equilibrium. Finally, the absolute level of the real net
unemployment bene…t (b) is determined by the requirement that the model be
able to generate an equilibrium unemployment rate equal to 0:08. Given these
parameter values we simulate the e¤ects of a 5 percentage point cut in the tax rate
on low–paid (secondary) labour, allowing the model to determine the required rise
28in the tax rate on high–paid (primary) labour. The results are presented in table
1.
Table 1. Labour Tax Reform and the Opportunities
for On–the–job Search
Change expressed in percentages: as = au as = 0
Tax rate in secondary sector¤ -5.0 -5.0
Tax rate in primary sector¤ 2.4 2.0
Employment in secondary sector 4.2 5.1
Employment in primary sector -3.0 -2.1
Unemployment¤ 0.2 -0.2
Welfare e¤ects (percent of GDP):
Change in sectoral allocation -0.44 -0.88
Change in total employment -0.03 0.83
Total welfare change -0.47 -0.05
¤ The change is expressed in percentage points
In the …rst column we show the e¤ects in the as = au case. The simulation
results con…rm the analytical …ndings from the previous section. Cutting ts by 5
percentage points requires increasing tp by 2:4 percentage points. Such a policy
will increase employment in the secondary sector by 4;2 percent while reducing
employment in the primary sector by 3;4 percent, causing an overall increase in
the unemployment rate from 8 to 8:2 percent.
The welfare e¤ect of the tax reform is measured by its impact on the ex-
pected lifetime utility of the representative worker, i.e., the lifetime utility which
the worker expects ex ante before knowing his employment status. Using (2.3),
(2.5), (2.8), (2.10), (2.18), (2.20), (2.21), (2.26), (2.27), (2.28) and the arbitrage
condition Vs = Vu, we …nd that expected lifetime utility V e may be written as
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s ¢ (1 + ±) ¢ np
N¡1 + ￿¢ (1 ¡ np) ¡ 1
#¡1 "





N ´ Np + Ns; np ´ Np=N; µ ´ (1 + ±)(½ + s)(± ¡ 1) ¡´
As noted earlier, our model economy is characterized by an ine¢ciently low
level of aggregate employment and by an ine¢ciently low primary sector share of
total employment. Accordingly, equation (4.1) implies that expected utility will
unambiguously increase in case of a rise in total employment, N; or in case of a
rise in the primary sector employment share, np.
The total welfare e¤ects given in the bottom row of Table 1 are measured
by the ex ante equivalent variation, de…ned as the hypothetical increase in lump
sum income which would generate the same change in expected utility as the
labour tax reform considered5. In the third row from the bottom of Table 1 we
report the isolated welfare e¤ect of the change in the primary sector share of total
employment (np), keeping total employment N constant at its initial level. In the
second row from the bottom the residual part of the total welfare e¤ect is then
ascribed to the change in aggregate employment. In the as = au case (￿= 1) we
5This welfare measure is in the spirit of Helms (1985).
30see from Table 1 that the labour tax reform causes a drop in welfare corresponding
to roughly half a percent of initial GDP. It is interesting to note that the sectoral
shift from primary to secondary sector employment accounts for almost all of the
fall in welfare, whereas the fall in total employment contributes very little to the
negative welfare e¤ect.
We now turn to the other benchmark case where as = 0 (￿= 0), i.e., the
Harris-Todaro assumption usually adopted in dual labour market models. To
understand the di¤erences between the as = au scenario and the as = 0 scenario,
let us consider how the tax reform will a¤ect wage formation in the two sectors
of the economy, noting from Table 1 that both scenarios involve a reduction in
Np and an increase in Ns. In both cases the fall in Np reduces the number of new
hirings in the primary sector and increases the number of people applying for a
primary sector job. Clearly this reduces the employment probability for all job
applicants. But in the Harris–Todaro case there is an o¤setting e¤ect, since the
reallocation of people from unemployment to secondary sector employment (the
increase in Ns) will reduce the number of people applying for primary sector jobs.
Ceteris paribus, this will increase the employment probability for those remaining
in the unemployment pool. The isolated e¤ect of this tendency for au to increase
will be to drive up wages in the primary sector, thereby causing a further reduction
of employment in that sector. This additional e¤ect arising in the Harris-Todaro
31case may be termed the ‘primary sector wage e¤ect’.
The second di¤erence between the two cases relates to wage formation in the
secondary sector. In the as = au case the secondary sector wage equals the sum
of the unemployment bene…t and the disutility of work, but in the Harris–Todaro
case the secondary sector wage also includes a wage premium compensating for
the forgone chance of obtaining a job in the primary sector. This wage premium
is proportional to the product of an unemployed worker’s probability of obtaining
a primary sector job (au) and the real net wage in the primary sector (which is
positively related to au). A lower value of au thus implies a lower wage premium.
In the Harris–Todaro case the tax reform involves both a positive and a nega-
tive e¤ect on au since the increase in Ns reduces the number of job applicants,
whereas the reduction in Np implies both fewer hirings and more job applicants.
If the latter e¤ect is stronger (and this turns out to be the case in the simulation
experiment) au will go down, thereby generating a lower secondary sector wage
and a greater rise in secondary employment in the Harris–Todaro case relative to
the as = au case. We will term this the ‘secondary sector wage e¤ect’.
If the secondary sector wage e¤ect on employment is positive and outweighs
the primary sector wage e¤ect, the impact of the labour tax reform will be more
bene…cial in the Harris-Todaro scenario. Comparing the two columns in Table 1,
we see that this is indeed the case, given our plausible parameter values. Thus,
32when as = 0 the contraction in primary sector employment is smaller, and the
expansion in secondary sector employment is greater than when as = au. As
a result unemployment is reduced from 8:0 to 7:8 percent of the labour force.
Despite the rise in total employment, the e¤ect on consumer welfare measured
by the ex ante equivalent variation is slightly negative. The decomposition shows
that the total welfare e¤ect is the net result of two almost o¤setting e¤ects: on
the one hand there is a large negative welfare e¤ect from the deterioration in the
sectoral allocation of employment, but on the other hand there is a large positive
e¤ect from the rise in total employment.
The policy e¤ects reported in Table 1 obviously depend on the speci…c pa-
rameter values mentioned earlier. However, experiments with di¤erent plausible
calibrations con…rmed that the e¤ects of the labour tax reform are in fact more
bene…cial in the Harris-Todaro case, and that the sign of the total welfare e¤ect
may even turn from negative to positive when going from as = au to as = 0.
5. Concluding remarks
The point of departure for this paper was the observation that the labour market
tends to be segmented into a primary sector o¤ering ‘good’ high-paying jobs and a
secondary sectoro¤ering‘bad’ low-paying jobs. Ouranalysissuggested that it may
be very important to allow for such dualism in the labour market when evaluating
the welfare e¤ects of recent proposals to shift the tax burden away from low-paid
33labour. The reason is that the implementation of such proposals might shift
employment from ‘good’ jobs to ‘bad’ jobs. Our speci…c model of a dual labour
market implied that, even if a labour tax reform succeeds in raising aggregate
employment, it may not improveeconomic e¢ciency if it causesa reallocation from
high-productive primary jobs to low-productive secondary jobs. As a byproduct
of our analysis, we also demonstrated that opportunities for on-the-job search
may have very important implications for the e¤ects of labour tax reform - and
potentially for other public policies as well - because on-the-job search a¤ects wage
formation in both sectors of the economy. Indeed, we saw that the conventional
but unrealistic assumption that only the unemployed can search for jobs may give
an overoptimistic picture of the e¤ects of labour tax reform.
While we presented our model as one of intersectoral dualism across di¤erent
production sectors, several other writers have focussed on intrasectoral dualism,
i.e. the phenomenon that ‘good’ jobs may coexist with ‘bad’ jobs within each sec-
tor or …rm (e.g., Saint Paul (1991), (1996), Rebitzer and Taylor (1991), Albrecht
and Vroman (1992)). It can be shown that our model can easily be reinterpreted
as a model of intrasectoral dualism6. In this reinterpretation we consider an econ-
omy with one production sector using two types of labour; i.e., primary workers
(say, those in the administration) and secondary workers (say, those along the
assembly line). All workers are identical, but it is more costly to monitor e¤ort
6The proof of this proposition is given in an appendix available from the authors.
34in the administrative o¢ces than along the assembly line. Hence primary workers
are paid e¢ciency wages, whereas secondary workers are paid the competitive
wage. This one-sector model turns out to be formally equivalent to the two-sector
model developed above when aggregate labour input (and hence aggregate out-
put) is modelled as a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of the two types of labour in the
same way as the two consumption goods are aggregated in the two-sector model.
Thus our analysis is more general than it might seem.
It goes without saying that our simpli…ed model does not necessarily destroy
the case for a labour tax reform shifting the tax burden away from low-paid
labour. For one thing, if such a reform succeeds in raising total employment,
policy makers may well see this as a social gain even if it does not improve the
economist’s measure of e¢ciency. Furthermore, if wage formation in the secondary
sector is monopsonistic rather than competitive, a tax cut for the low-paid could
have an additional bene…cial e¤ect by o¤setting the depressing e¤ect of monopsony
on secondary employment. More generally, proponents of tax cuts for low-paid
workers have argued that such a policy will a) create a stronger incentive for
the unemployed and for individuals working in the informal economy to accept
available jobs, and b) create new jobs for low-productive unemployed workers
by paving the way for lower wages at the bottom end of the pay scale. On the
cost side, critics have argued that, once one accounts for the need to …nance the
35tax cuts for low-paid workers through higher taxes on high-paid workers, the tax
reform will c) reallocate labour from primary to secondary employment, and d)
increase the relative supply of low-skilled labour by weakening the incentive for
education and upgrading of skills. The present paper only accounts for e¤ects a)
and c), and it has tried to highlight the signi…cance of the distinction between
‘good’ jobs and ‘bad’ jobs. However, because we neglected worker heterogeneity
and the associated distributional concerns, we were unable to account for e¤ect
b), i.e., the fact that ‘bad’ jobs may be better than no jobs for those who are
currently excluded from the labour market because they cannot live up to normal
productivity standards. Allowing for this phenomenon and for the impact of tax
progressivity on skill formation are important tasks for future research on the
e¤ects of labour tax reform.
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